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Economies with the Euro Area? Evidence from a 
Structural Factor model 
1.  Introduction 
In  May 2004,  eight  central  and  east  European  countries  (CEECs),  the  Czech  Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, (as well as Malta and 
Cyprus) became members of the European Union. Sooner or later, these countries will all join 
European Monetary Union (EMU). The successful enlargement of EMU requires a number of 
criteria to be satisfied. Those are optimum currency area (OCA) criteria and (Maastricht) 
criteria which partly reflect the OCA criteria. The latter stress the importance of long-run 
convergence of accession countries and members of the monetary union and include a high 
degree of price stability, a sound fiscal situation, stable exchange rates and converged long-
term interest rates.
1 The OCA criteria go back to Mundell (1961), MacKinnon (1963) and 
Kenen (1969),  among  others,  and  focus  on  the  integration  through  trade  and  the 
synchronization  of  business  cycles  between  candidate  and  member  countries.  If  business 
cycles are not synchronized, possibly as a result of asymmetric shocks or differences in the 
transmission of common shocks due to different economic structures and policies, a common 
monetary policy whose task is to monitor aggregate inflation and output may create conflicts 
across countries about the preferred conduct of monetary policy, and an early enlargement of 
a monetary union may be very costly.  
The present paper addresses the current discussion on whether the CEECs are ready to join 
EMU by closer examining the synchronization between economies of the CEECs and the euro 
area between 1993 and 2003. We first establish some stylized facts on economic linkages in 
the euro area and CEECs and their determinants. The latter are approximated with a similarity 
in industry specialization and trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) intensity measures. 
The former is examined by means of bilateral dynamic correlations and their multivariate 
extension, termed cohesion, both measures being based on Croux, Forni and Reichlin (2001). 
We  then  employ  a  large-scale  structural  dynamic  factor  model,  developed  by  Giannone, 
Reichlin and Sala (2002), to investigate how important shocks to the euro-area business cycle 
are  for  CEECs  in  comparison  to  the  EMU  members  and  how  they  proliferate  to  these 
countries. As a byproduct, we determine the dimension of the euro-area economy, i.e., the 
number of macroeconomic shocks which were common to all EMU countries and which 
explained a significant share of the overall variance during the underlying period, and identify 
them.  This  is  particularly  interesting  for  the  period  considered  here  where  there  was 
controversy about the determinants of macroeconomic developments. Finally, we carry out a 
                                                 
1   See www.ecb.int/ecb/enlargement/html/index.en.html. 
  2counterfactual experiment in the spirit of Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) to assess the 
costs (or benefits) in terms of output and inflation variability that would have resulted if the 
CEECs had already been members of EMU, and to examine possible consequences of EMU 
enlargement  on  synchronization,  thereby  acknowledging  the  endogeneity  of  economic 
synchronization. 
Our paper is related to the burgeoning empirical literature on business cycle synchronization 
between the CEECs and the euro area. A comprehensive survey is given by the meta-analysis 
carried out by Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2004). Most studies simply compute static correlations 
between real economic activity in the CEECs and the euro area or Germany (e.g. Darvás and 
Szapáry (2004), Demanyk and Volosovych (2005), von Hagen and Traistaru (2005)). Artis, 
Marcellino and Proietti (2004), in addition, use concordance measures to investigate whether 
business cycles of CEECs are in or out of phase with business cycles of other CEECs and of 
euro-area countries. Another bulk of the literature estimates supply and demand shocks in the 
euro  area  and  in  the  CEECs  by  means  of  small-scale  VAR  models  and  assess  their 
correlations  (Frenkel  and  Nickel (2002),  Fidrmuc  and  Korhonen (2003),  Hall  and 
Hondroyiannis (2004)).  Barrell  and  Holland (2004)  focus  on  the  correlation  of  shocks 
estimated with the large macro model NIGEM. A third strand investigates the transmission of 
euro-area  shocks  in  a  VAR  modeling  framework  (Korhonen (2003),  Darvas  and 
Szapáry (2004)) and with single equation models (Boone and Maurel (1999)). We contribute 
to the first and the third strands of this literature. 
Our paper is also related to other applications of large-scale structural dynamic factor models 
which  have  become  popular  in  recent  years  (see,  for  example,  Giannone,  Reichlin  and 
Sala (2002,  2004),  Sala (2003),  Cimadomo (2003)  for  monetary  policy  applications  and 
Eickmeier (2004)  for  an  international  business  cycle  application).  Sala’s (2003)  study  is 
probably  most  similar  in  terms  of  methodology.  Based  on  the  period  1985  to  1998,  he 
identifies  a  common  euro-area  monetary  policy  shock  and  investigates  its  impact  on  key 
variables of individual EMU member countries. He also performs a counterfactual experiment 
where he restricts the national interest rate responses to the common monetary policy shock to 
equal the average euro-area interest rate response and examines the responses of industrial 
production in EMU countries under this scenario.
2  
We go beyond the literature in various respects.  
   First, economic linkages between CEECs and the euro area have, to our knowledge, not 
been investigated with dynamic correlations and cohesion before. These measures have 
the favorable feature that not only contemporaneous covariances, but also covariances at 
leads and lags are accounted for.  
                                                 
2   It is also in order to mention the study by Banerjee, Marcellino and Masten (2004) who fit national large-scale 
dynamic factor models to five CEECs to forecast GDP growth and inflation in these countries. The authors 
find  that,  in  some  cases,  namely  for  Hungary  and  Slovenia,  the  inclusion  of  euro-area  information  can 
improve the forecasting performance of the national factor models. 
  3   Second,  our  study  is  the  first  examining  the  transmission  of  euro-area  shocks  to  the 
CEECs in a large-dimensional structural factor framework. Performing macroeconomic 
analysis in general and studying international business cycles in such a framework has 
various advantages over VAR models or structural models which are more frequently 
used  in  this  context.  Much  information  can  be  exploited  in  dynamic  factor  models 
whereas  VAR  modelers  rapidly  run  into  scarce  degrees  of  freedom  problems  which 
should  allow  us  to  estimate  the  common  driving  forces  and  their  propagation  more 
precisely. This may play a particularly important role here, where macroeconomic time 
series of CEECs are available only for a short time span. A large cross-dimension can 
partly  mitigate  this  drawback.
3  Another  advantage  is  that  the  possibly  heterogeneous 
responses of a large number of variables (all variables in the set) to common shocks can 
be investigated. This turns out to be very useful here. It is also advantageous that we can 
remain agnostic about the structure of the economy and do not need to rely on overly tight 
restrictions as is sometimes the case in structural models.
4 Here also lies an advantage 
over structural VAR (SVAR) models where the researcher has to take a stance on the 
variables  to  include  which,  in  turn,  influence  the  outcome,  and  where  the  number  of 
variables determines the number of shocks. The only assumptions which are made in 
structural factor models serve to identify common structural shocks. However - and this 
represents another advantage -, the number of required identifying restrictions is generally 
much  lower  than  the  number  of  variables  in  the  system,  where  in  VAR  models,  the 
number of restrictions has to be at least equal to the number of variables. 
   We assess the transmission of three structural euro-area shocks, a supply shock, a demand 
shock  and  a  monetary  policy  shock.  We  therewith  extend  the  studies  by  Darvás  and 
Szapáry (2004), Korhonen (2003) and Boone and Maurel (1999) who focus on shocks to 
European  (or  German)  real  economic  activity  which,  however,  have  no  structural 
interpretation. Moreover, those studies do not provide confidence bands, which we will do 
here.  
   Finally,  we  carry  out  a  counterfactual  experiment  as  in  Sala (2003).  We  extend  his 
analysis to the CEECs. In addition to restricting individual countries’ interest rates to the 
euro-area  average,  we  also  restrict  exchange  rates.  We  believe  that  conditioning  both 
interest and exchange rates better reproduces the EMU environment. Our focus on the cost 
and benefits in terms of economic volatilities and on synchronization which may result 
from an EMU enlargement also differs from Sala’s (2003) focus which is mainly on the 
transmission of a common monetary policy. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 establishes some 
stylized facts on economic correlations and their determinants. Section 4 outlines the factor 
                                                 
3   Banerjee, Marcellino and Masten (2004) also stress this advantage. 
4   These drawbacks inherent in traditional small-scale VAR models are not present in the Global VAR model 
recently brought forward by Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran and Smith (2004). 
  4model and describes the estimation and the identification of the common structural euro-area 
shocks. Section 5 characterizes the shocks. Section 6 assesses the transmission to the CEECs. 
Section 7 carries out the counterfactual experiment, and Section 8 concludes. 
2.  Data 
Our data set contains 41 aggregate euro-area macroeconomic time series, 19 or 20 key macro 
variables of each of the core euro-area countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain), real GDP, consumer prices, short-term interest rates and exchange rates 
for the remaining euro-area economies (Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal) and 
for eight CEECs (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, 
Slovakia).
5 In addition, we include some global variables, among them US GDP and world 
energy prices. Studies have shown that fluctuations in these variables may influence the euro 
area  (see,  for  example,  IMF (2001),  Jiménez-Rodríguez  and  Sánchez (2005),  Dalsgaard, 
André and Richardson (2001), Peersman (2005)). The aggregate euro-area series are taken 
from the data set underlying the ECB’s Area Wide Model (for a detailed description see 
Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001)). The remaining series mainly stem from OECD and IMF 
statistics. Overall, we include   quarterly series. The sample ranges from 1993Q1 to 
2003Q4. Most series from the CEECs are not available for a longer time span. At the same 
time, this period has the favorable feature that the transitional recessions experienced by the 
CEECs in the early 1990s are largely excluded. 
235   N
The  factor  analysis  requires  some  pre-treatment  of  the  data.  Series  exhibiting  a  seasonal 
pattern were seasonally adjusted with the Census X11 seasonal adjustment method. Integrated 
series were made stationary through differencing. There are some nominal variables which are 
not treated consistently in the literature. For many countries, we found prices, unit labor costs 
and monetary aggregates to be I(2) and interest and exchange rates to be I(1). Since non-
stationarities  can  distort  factor  estimates,  we  include  the  second  and,  respectively,  first 
differences  of  these  variables  for  all  countries  and  the  euro-area  aggregates  in  the  set. 
Logarithms were taken of the series which were not in rates or negative, and we removed 
outliers.
6 We standardized the series to have a mean of zero and a variance of one. Table 1 
contains a complete listing of the data included. 
                                                 
5   Of most countries (except for Lithuania - the reason will be given below), we include nominal bilateral 
exchange rates with the US Dollar. This is problematic since they are the same from 1999 on for the EMU 
countries (except for Greece which completed stage three of EMU accession in 2001). However, below, we 
will carry out a counterfactual experiment, which would become complicated if effective instead of bilateral 
exchange rates had been included in the set. Notice that we also estimated our factor model with effective 
exchange rates instead of bilateral exchange rates and obtain quasi identical factor estimates. 
6   Outliers are defined as observations that differed from the median by more than three times the sample 
interquartile range. Those were removed by setting them to this extreme bound.  
  53.  Stylized facts on economic linkages 
In this section, we establish stylized facts on economic linkages between the CEECs and the 
euro area and within the groups of CEECs and of EMU countries. In a first step, we have a 
look at some descriptive statistics on the determinants of economic comovements. These are 
not included in the data set. One statistic describes similarities in industry specialization. If 
structurally similar countries are hit by industry-specific shocks, this should lead business 
cycles to move in parallel, which is confirmed empirically for the CEECs by von Hagen and 
Traistaru (2005).  Other  statistics  we  use  measure  the  integration  of  CEECs  and  EMU 
countries through trade and FDI. Although theoretically not clear, the impact of trade and 
financial integration on business cycle synchronization was shown to be positive in empirical 
studies (e.g. von Hagen and Traistaru (2005) for CEECs and Otto, Voss and Willard (2001), 
Kose,  Otrok  and  Whiteman (2003a,b)  as  well  as  Imbs (2004)  for  industrial  and  other 
countries). In a second step, we link output and inflation of CEECs and the euro area with 
uni- and multivariate dynamic correlation measures. 
Following Krugman (1991), we define structural similarities of a country j and the euro area 
, here denoted by EA, as follows:  j S
  ,  (1)    
 
   
L
l
lEA lj j s s S
1
| |
where   and   denote the shares of industry l in total value added of country j and, 
respectively, the euro area.
7 Small values indicate greater structural similarity.  
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jk EX /   and  /   denote  exports/direct  investment  of  country  j  to  region  k 
(which is the (rest of the) euro area or the world) and, respectively imports/direct investment 
out FDI jk jk IM
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7   The  industries  Agriculture  and  fishing,  Manufacturing,  Construction,  Trade  and  transport,  Finance  and 
business as well as Other services are considered. 
  6from region k to country j.   and   denote nominal GDP of country j and region k.
8 
Those indexes are based on Frankel and Rose (1998) and Deardorff (1998) (and used and 
discussed in Clark and Wincoop (2001)).
9 TR
2 and FDI




1, where large countries tend to exhibit large values, they do not 
depend on size effects and may be a more accurate measure of trade intensity between two 
countries/regions.  For  data  availability  reasons,  we  focus  on  2003  (for  the  structural 
similarities and FDI measures) and 2002 (for the trade measure). 
j GDP k GDP
On  average,  individual  EMU  countries  exhibit  an  industry  specialization  which  is  more 
similar to the euro-area industry specialization than CEECs (Table 2). The discrepancy is 
even larger when Portugal, Ireland and Greece are excluded from the group of EMU group. 
These three small peripheral countries were found to exhibit a relatively low synchronization 
with the rest of the euro area and are sometimes treated separately (e.g. Korhonen (2003), 
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2004)). Of the CEECs, Hungary and Estonia exhibit low values, 
whereas Lithuania and the Czech Republic are specialized on rather different industries than 
the euro area. Value added in the manufacturing industry is relatively high and in the finance 
and other business industry relatively low in the Czech Republic compared to euro area, 
whereas  Lithuania  still  has  large  agriculture  and  fishing  as  well  as  trade  and  transports 
industries and a small financial industry. According to von Hagen and Traistaru (2005) and 
based on four sectors, there is evidence of structural change in the CEECs towards more 
similarity with the euro area between 1994 and 2002, except for Hungary which already 
exhibited a quite similar industry specialization in the beginning of the 1990s. This is not 
captured by our one-point-in-time-analysis.  
Of the EMU members, industry structures in Luxemburg, Greece and Ireland also differ quite 
much  from  those  in  the  euro  area,  with  Luxemburg  being  relatively  specialized  in  the 
financial  industry,  Greece  having  large  agriculture,  construction  as  well  as  trade  and 
transports  industries  and  Ireland  a  relatively  large  manufacturing  and  small  services 
industries.  Interestingly,  CEECs  seem  to  be  more  heterogeneous in  terms  of  the  industry 
specialization measure than EMU countries.  
EMU countries are on average more integrated in terms of trade with each other and the rest 
of the world than CEECs are with the euro area and the rest of the world according to the TR
1 
measures. This, however, does not hold anymore if size effects are excluded, see the TR
2 
measures to which we refer in the following. Of the CEECs, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Estonia are most highly integrated with the euro area and the rest of the world. 
The  measures  for  these  countries  are  even  larger  than  those  for  various  EMU  members 
countries; Greek trade with the euro area and the rest of the world is especially low. Of the 
                                                 
8   When j refers to a EMU country, GDP  is GDP of the rest of the euro area or world.   k 9   The authors, however, construct them only with respect to trade, not FDI.  
10  We omit the scale factors included in the Deardorff (1998) measures since we are not interested in the values 
themselves, but only in the trade and FDI intensities of some countries relative to other countries. 
  7CEECs, Latvia and Lithuania do not trade much with the euro area and the rest of the world. 
As concerns FDI intensity, both the FDI
1 and, in contrast to trade integration, also the FDI
2 
measures  indicate  higher  integration  of  EMU  countries  compared  to  CEECs.  Notice 
especially the high values for Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium. Of the CEECs, values are 
relatively high for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia and Hungary, whereas FDI linkages 
seem to be unimportant for Lithuania. In contrast to the industry specialization measure, the 
dispersion across CEECs is smaller, and this holds for all integration measures. 
We now extract GDP growth and changes in CPI inflation of individual countries and the 
corresponding euro-area aggregates from our large data set. Those are shown in Figure 1. 
There is evidence of some economic comovement between CEECs and the euro area. Output 
linkages  seem  looser  than  inflation  linkages,  and  the  comovements  with  the  euro-area 
aggregates are stronger for individual EMU countries than for CEECs. It should be kept in 
mind that the euro-area aggregates include output and inflation growth from individual EMU 
countries. Those should therefore, by construction, be more highly correlated with the euro-
area aggregates than CEECs’ output and inflation growth. In addition, output and inflation 
growth in larger EMU countries can be expected to be more highly correlated to the euro-area 
aggregates which are weighted averages, than output and inflation growth in smaller EMU 
countries.  
To establish stylized facts on cyclical synchronization, we compute three statistics. Our first 
statistic  is  dynamic  correlations  between  output  and  inflation  growth  from  individual 
countries  and  the  corresponding  euro-area  aggregates.  This  measure  has  recently  been 
proposed by Croux, Forni and Reichlin (2001). The dynamic correlation between two series 
 and   at frequency  i y j y   is defined as 
  ) ( ) ( / ) ( ) ( , ,          
j i j i j i y y y y y y S S C   ,  (4)  
where  ) ( 
i y S   and  ) ( 
j y S   denote  the  spectral  density  functions  of  the  two  series  and 
) ( 
j iy y C  the co-spectrum. Dynamic correlations have the convenient property that they lie 
between -1 and 1. Phase shifts are eliminated and, besides contemporaneous covariances, 
covariances at leads and lags are taken into account. It should again be kept in mind that a 
bias in the measure results from the fact that the euro-area aggregates contain output and 
inflation growth from individual EMU countries. Nevertheless, we will be able to derive some 
interesting conclusions when comparing correlations of output and inflation growth in smaller 
EMU countries and the CEECs. 
Our second statistic is the lags or leads at which aggregate euro-area variables exhibit the 
maximum correlation with variables of individual countries. We allow for a maximum of four 
leads and four lags. Positive values indicate by how many quarters the euro-area aggregate 
leads the corresponding individual country’s variable.  
  8Croux,  Forni  and  Reichlin (2001)  extended  the  dynamic  correlation  measure  to  the 
multivariate case. The so called cohesion, which is the third statistic to which we refer, is 
defined as the weighted average of dynamic correlations between all possible pairs of series 
belonging to a certain group  y ~: 
     
   
 
j i j i
j i y y j i y w w w w coh
j i / ) ( ) ( , ~       ,  (5) 
where   denotes the weight for variable  . We give equal weight to the variables, so that 
. We focus on the groups of all countries, CEECs, EMU member countries and 
EMU member countries without Portugal, Ireland and Greece. The three statistics are reported 
in Tables 3 and 4 and in Figure 2. The following conclusions can be drawn.  
i w i y
i wi     , 1
   Output  and  inflation  growth  in  EMU  countries  are  on  average  (this  refers  to  the 
unweighted average) more highly correlated with the corresponding euro-area aggregates 
(0.63 and, respectively, 0.47 at business cycle frequencies
11) than in the CEECs (0.17 to 
0.20). The discrepancy is larger when Greece, Portugal and Ireland are excluded from the 
EMU  group.  Not  surprisingly  (as  mentioned  above),  of  the  current  EMU  members, 
dynamic correlations are highest for the largest economies France and Germany. With 
respect to output growth, they are very low for Portugal and even negative for Greece. 
With respect to changes in inflation, Portugal and - perhaps surprisingly - the Netherlands 
exhibit very low values.
12 There is also considerable heterogeneity within the group of 
CEECs. Dynamic correlations of output growth are relatively high for Slovenia, Hungary, 
Poland and Estonia (but still lower than for most of the EMU countries), whereas they are 
very low or even slightly negative for the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia. The 
Russian crisis in 1998/99 which mainly affected the Baltic countries and, although to a 
lesser extent, Slovakia as well as the Czech financial crisis in 1996/97 may explain these 
loose  linkages.  Correlations  of  inflation  growth  are  highest  for  Lithuania,  Poland, 
Slovenia and Hungary (but are, again, still lower than for most EMU countries) and, on 
the other extreme, virtually zero for Slovakia. 
   Inflation growth of the CEECs seems to be somewhat more correlated to its euro-area 
counterpart than output growth. This may be explained by the main focus on disinflation 
of central and east European central banks in the 1990s. 
   The dispersion of dynamic correlations seems to be higher across EMU members than 
across CEECs. The difference, however, falls when Greece, Portugal and Ireland are not 
                                                 
11  We focus in this section on business cycle frequencies (6 to 32 quarters which corresponds to the frequency 
band 0.2 to 1.0 and which is usually assumed), since only focusing on all frequencies may mask high values 
in some frequency bands and low or negative values in others. 
12  Value added and ecological tax increases in the Netherlands may have influenced Dutch consumer prices and 
led them to move independently from euro-area consumer prices. Notice that the Dutch GDP deflator and 
producer prices move much more in parallel with euro-area prices. 
  9taken into account (relative positions even change for output growth at business cycle 
frequencies). 
   Fluctuations  in  aggregate  euro-area  output  and  inflation  growth  generally  do  not  (or 
barely) lead or lag fluctuations in individual countries’ output and inflation growth. An 
exception is Luxemburg which lags the euro area in terms of output growth by one quarter 
and where the correlation is notable. Results for other countries which lag behind or lead 
the euro-area aggregate should be interpreted with caution; the correlations are quite low 
(all lower than 0.4) and they vary substantially across different leads and lags. In some 
cases, the sign is even reversed when contemporaneous and maximum correlations are 
compared.  
   Our cohesion measures suggest more synchronization across EMU countries than across 
CEECs. On average over all frequencies it amounts to 0.21 in EMU and to 0.10 in the 
group of CEECs with respect to output growth. This difference increases when Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland are not taken into account and when only business cycle frequencies 
are considered. The cohesion measures are higher for inflation growth (0.28 for the EMU 
group and 0.16 for the CEECs’ group). 
Our findings are roughly in line with existing studies. We find particularly high business 
cycle  correlations  between  Hungary,  Poland  and  Slovenia  and  the  euro  area,  which  is 
consistent  with  the  literature  (Fidrmuc  and  Korhonen (2004)).  In  addition,  we  confirm 
previous findings that correlations are higher for many CEECs than for Greece and Portugal. 
Dynamic correlations suggest that the group of EMU countries is more heterogeneous than 
the group of CEECs. This result, however, differs from Artis, Marcellino and Proietti (2004) 
and Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003) who find the opposite.  
4.  Model, estimation and identification of shocks 
This section introduces the factor model which will serve us to investigate the transmission of 
euro-area shocks to the CEECs. The series are collected in the  1   N  vector  . It is assumed 
that   follows an approximate dynamic factor model (e.g. Stock and Watson (1998, 2002), 
Bai and Ng (2002)) and can be represented as: 
t Y
t Y
  ,  (6)  t t t
m
j
j t j t t t                        
 
  F f X Y
0
where   is a   vector of common dynamic euro-area factors and   is a 
 matrix of factor loadings associated with lag j.   and 
t f 1   q ) ,..., 0 ( m j j    
q N  t X t    are a   vectors of 
common and idiosyncratic components. The latter are allowed to be weakly cross-correlated 
and weakly serially correlated in the sense of Bai and Ng (2002). The loadings can differ 
1   N
  10across variables.   is a vector of  t F q r    so called static factors that comprises the dynamic 
factors   and all lags of the factors that enter with at least one non-zero weight in the factor 
representation.  The    matrix 
t f
r N      comprises  all  non-zero  columns  of  ) ,..., ( 0 m     . 
Typically,  . By construction, the vector   is driven by   shocks that result from the 
VAR representation of the factors:  
N r    t F q
  .  (8)  t
p
l
t-l l t v f A f
1
    
 
The shocks   are related to the orthogonal innovations   through the structural equation   t w t v
  t t v ' R w   .  (9) 
Provided that there are enough identifying restrictions on R , the structural shocks   can be 
recovered from the factor innovations.  
t w
The ultimate goal is to identify   and to assess impulse responses of individual variables to 
these shocks. For this purpose, we first estimate   by applying static principal component 
analysis to  . Stock and Watson (1998) have shown that the principal component estimator 




  as long as  . This may be 
relevant here, since the CEECs go through a phase of structural change and their sensitivity to 
fluctuations in the euro-area economies may have changed over time. The dimension of  , 
0 /   N T
t F
r, was estimated to be 5 on the basis of the Bai and Ng (2002) ICp3 criterion, although the 
criteria ICp1 and ICp2 suggest an estimate of  r of 2 (Table 5).
13 One reason for our choice is 
that factors are still estimated consistently if the number of common factors is overestimated, 
but not if it is underestimated (Stock and Watson (1998), Kapetanios and Marcellino (2003), 
Artis, Banerjee and Marcellino (2004)). Another reason is that five factors explain 44% of the 
total variance, which is consistent with previous findings for macroeconomic euro-area data 
sets
14, whereas the share accounted for by two factors is relatively low (26%), see Table 6. 
To  estimate  the  innovations  ,  we  follow  Giannone,  Reichlin  and  Sala (2002)  and  fit  a 
VAR(1) model to the estimated vector of static factors  . The lag order of the VAR model 
was estimated with the Schwarz information criterion. It is important to note that the VAR 
representation for   is singular if the 
t v
t F ˆ
t F ˆ r-dimensional vector   is driven by  t F ˆ r q    shocks. To 
estimate the  -dimensional vector   from the  q t v r-dimensional vector of residuals of the fitted 
VAR  based  on  ,  a  principal  component  analysis  is  employed.  This  yields  the  linear 
combination of the   non-zero components in the residual vector of the VAR model. Let   
t F ˆ
q t v ˆ
                                                 
13  Bai and Ng (2002) suggest three other criteria which, however, depend on the maximum number of factors 
allowed for and which we do not consider here. 
14  Those range between 32% and 55% (Eickmeier (2005), Marcellino, Stock and Watson (2000), Altissimo, 
Bassanetti, Cristadoro, Forni, Hallin, Lippi and Reichlin (2001)). 
  11denote the resulting vector of orthogonal factor innovations. The number of dynamic factors 
  was  estimated  to  be  3  with  the  consistent  Schwarz  criterion  of  Breitung  and 
Kretschmer (2004) (Table 7). This estimate is also consistent with our estimate of 
q
r: three 
dynamic factors, estimated with dynamic principal component analysis, roughly account for 
the same total variance share as five static principal components (Table 6).
15  
The common structural shocks   can now be recovered as in the SVAR literature. The 
matrix   is chosen such that certain identifying restrictions that need to be specified are 
satisfied. We aim at estimating an aggregate euro-area supply shock, an aggregate euro-area 
real demand shock and a common monetary policy shock.
16 This is achieved by applying the 
identification  scheme  recently  proposed  by  Peersman  (2005)  which  consists  in  imposing 
short-run  sign  restrictions  on  impulse  responses.  This  prevents  us  from  using  long-run 
restrictions  which  are  common  in  the  structural  VAR  (and  structural  dynamic  factor) 
literature,  but  which  may  be  problematic  here  given  the  small  number  of  observations 
available.
17 We can also avoid commonly employed zero restrictions which are at odds with 
some  theoretical  models  (see  the  discussions  in  Peersman  (2005)  and  in  Canova  and  de 
Nicólo (2003)).  
t w
R
Following Peersman (2005), we impose the following restrictions. A positive supply shock 
has non-negative effects on output and non-positive effects on prices contemporaneously and 
during the first four quarters after the shock; the short-term interest rate does not increase on 
impact. A positive demand shock affects output and prices non-negatively instantaneously 
and during the first four quarters after the shock; the immediate effect on the short-term 
interest rate is non-negative. A positive monetary policy shock finally does not raise the short-
term interest rate on impact; output and prices do not decrease contemporaneously and during 
the  first  four  quarters  after  the  shock.  These  conditions  are  consistent  with  the  standard 
aggregate supply-aggregate demand framework and with more complex structural models like 
the DSGE model outlined in Smets and Wouters (2002). The  1   q  vector of impulse response 
functions  of  variable    to  the  shocks  i    ' w ... w w 1 qt t t     at  horizon    is  given  by 
. We report the median impulse responses and 90% confidence bands which 
were constructed using bootstrap techniques. For details on the estimation and the bootstrap, 
see Appendix A.  
h
t h it ih y w /         
5.  Characterization of euro-area shocks 
                                                 
15  Forni,  Hallin,  Lippi  and  Reichlin (2000)  derived  informal  criteria  to  select  q  which  are  also  based  on 
dynamic principal component analysis.  
16  It is not unusual to identify euro-area monetary policy shocks even before the ECB replaced the national 
central banks as monetary authorities in 1999. Peersman and Smets (2001) and Sala (2003), for example, also 
identified common monetary policy shocks using synthetic data.  
17  This has already been pointed out by Darvás and Szapáry (2004).  
  12Figure 3 plots the median point estimates of the structural shock series. As already pointed out 
in the introduction, the fact that we can estimate the impact of the shocks on all variables in 
the system enables us to better characterize the shocks. This is particularly interesting for the 
period considered here. In this period, the euro area experienced an expansion until the end of 
2000, followed by a slowdown and a phase of stabilization.
18 There was (and still is) some 
controversy about the underlying shocks.  
In what follows, we identify the main sources of economic fluctuations in the euro area. 
Table 8 shows that the overwhelming part of key euro-area aggregate variables is explained 
by the common factors: 88% of output growth and more than 70% of changes in inflation and 
the  short-term  interest  rates.  Exceptions  are  consumption  and  employment  growth.  The 
variance of these variables is mainly explained by the idiosyncratic component.
19  
Impulse  responses,  shown  in  Figure 4,  look  roughly  consistent  with  those  found  in  the 
literature. However, some differences to Peersman (2005) appear.
20 We find persistent effects 
of the demand and the monetary policy shocks on output and prices and of the demand shock 
on interest rates, whereas these shocks display only transitory effects in Peersman (2005). 
There are three possible explanations for the different shapes of impulse responses. First, 
remember that we differenced the series unless they were already stationary as has become 
the usual proceeding in large-dimensional factor analysis. I.e. our panel contains prices in 
second and interest rates in first differences. Peersman (2005), by contrast, includes prices and 
interest rates in first differences and, respectively, in levels and a linear time trend in his VAR 
model. Second, we focus on a different period (Peersman’s (2005) period is from 1980Q1 to 
2002Q2), and the nature of the shocks may have changed over time. Third, we estimate a 
factor model with many variables as opposed to Peersman (2005) whose VAR model contains 
four variables. If important variables are omitted, this may lead to biased parameter estimates 
and  may  yield  counterintuitive  impulse  response  functions,  as  shown,  for  example,  by 
Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2003). To find out, which of the three explanations is valid, we 
fitted a VAR model to consumer prices in second differences and short-term interest rates and 
GDP in first differences for the period underlying our analysis as well as for the period 1980 
to 2003. This yielded impulse response functions very similar to those obtained based on the 
factor model, suggesting that the shock identification does not hinge much on the variables 
not included in the VAR model. We are able to replicate Peersman’s (2005) results when we 
included prices in first differences and interest rates in levels as well as a linear time trend in 
                                                 
18  See www.cepr.org/data/Dating/. 
19  This is consistent with Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003) and Eickmeier (2005) who find that world and 
regional factors explain a smaller share of consumption growth than of output growth in most euro-area 
countries and with the quantity anomaly puzzle emphasized in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992). The 
puzzle is that international risk sharing theoretically implies high correlations of consumption across countries 
and lower cross-country output correlations, whereas empirically, consumption is found to be correlated to a 
weaker extent than output. 
20  We compare our results with Peersman’s (2005) since we use his identification scheme. Findings from other 
studies employing zero restrictions already differ by construction. 
  13the VAR model and when we estimated the model for the period 1980 to 2003. When we 
estimated the model for the more recent period, the demand shock displays temporary effects 
on output and interest rates, but still permanent effects on prices. The monetary policy shock 
has still long-lasting effects on output and prices. Overall, this exercise leads us to conclude 
that it is the treatment of the data and our focus on a more recent period that can explain 
differences between our and Peersman’s (2005) findings.  
Most of the variance of the forecast error of the common component of euro-area output 
associated with the entire period 1993 to 2003 can be explained by the demand and monetary 
policy shocks (40% and 39%) at forecast horizons zero to five years (Table 9).
21 Only 19% is 
accounted for by the supply shock. By contrast, the common component of inflation was 
mainly affected by the supply shock (76%). The demand shock accounts for 16% and the 
monetary policy shock for 7% at all horizons.  
By  means  of  historical  decompositions,  we  also  estimated  the  contributions  of  the  three 
shocks separately for the phase of expansion (until 2000Q4) and the subsequent slowdown 
(and stabilization) phase (from 2001Q1 to 2003Q4), see Table 10 and Figure 5. During the 
expansion, the demand shock mainly stimulated real economic activity in the euro area (after 
some  stimulus  from  the  monetary  policy  and  the  supply  shocks  at  the  beginning  of  this 
phase). The contribution of the monetary policy shock to the forecast error was also positive, 
but smaller. The contribution of the supply shock was virtually zero. Inflation during this 
period  increased  only  modestly  -  in  contrast  to  what  is  typically  observed  in  periods  of 
economic expansion - mainly due to the positive supply shock. It is striking how much in 
parallel the paths of the total forecast error of the common component of inflation and of the 
corresponding forecast error explained only by the supply shock move. We therefore can 
partly  confirm  the  ‘new  economy’  hypothesis  for  the  euro  area  in  the  1990s;  the  new 
technologies may not have had a particularly favorable impact on output, but on inflation. As 
concerns  the  slowdown  and  subsequent  stabilization  period,  output  was  depressed  by  the 
monetary policy and demand shocks. Inflation remained relatively high: inflationary pressures 
from the negative supply shock seem to have compensated effects from the negative demand 
shock. 
Other  questions  raised  in  view  of  the  two  economic  phases  were  on  the  reasons  for  the 
massive  depreciation  of  the  Euro  (against  the  Dollar)  during  the  expansion,  and  on  the 
determinants of stock prices. In particular, it is controversial whether monetary policy fueled 
the stock market bubble in the second half of the 1990s and provoked its subsequent bursting. 
Figure 4 shows that the euro-area real effective exchange rate does not react significantly to 
supply and demand shocks. But it depreciates significantly in response to the monetary policy 
shock, which is consistent with theory (see, for example, the model outlined in Clarida and 
                                                 
21  It is referred to the median estimate and to forecast horizons zero to five years. Variance decompositions for 
the short run (zero to one year) and the medium run (three to five years) are available upon request. 
  14Galí (1994)). Most of the forecast error variance of the common component of the exchange 
rate is also explained by the monetary policy shock (64% at all horizons), followed by the 
demand shock (26%) and the supply shock (9%). This is in line with empirical findings by 
Canzoneri,  Vallés  and  Viñals (1996)  for  euro-area  countries  and  those  by  Clarida  and 
Galí (1994) for Germany at short-term forecast horizons. By contrast, demand shocks explain 
most of medium-run exchange rate fluctuations in Clarida and Galí (1994). This is, however, 
partly  due  to  the  identification  scheme,  which  imposes  zero  long-run  responses  of  the 
exchange rate to the monetary policy shock. According to our historical decompositions, the 
real effective euro-area exchange rate was mainly driven by the demand, but also by the 
monetary policy shocks during the expansion (Table 10).  
Fluctuations  of  the  common  components  of  stock  prices  were  mainly  determined  by  the 
monetary policy shock. It explained on average over all core euro-area countries
22 51% of the 
forecast error variance at horizons zero to five years. The remaining variance is accounted for 
by the supply and the demand shocks in roughly equal shares. This is in line with our findings 
based on historical decompositions. The stock market boom during the expansion was mainly 
due  to  the  monetary  policy  shock.  The  demand  shock  also  had  a  stimulating,  although 
smaller, impact on stock prices. Perhaps surprisingly, the supply shock barely contributed to 
stock  prices  increases.  The  subsequent  strong  downturn  can  also  be  explained  by  the 
monetary  policy  shock;  the  supply  shock  also  contributed  negatively  to  stock  price 
fluctuations, but to a smaller extent. 
23 
It is often argued that external shocks, and in particular US shocks, played a major role for the 
euro area during the period on which our analysis is based. We cannot exclude that external 
shocks  underlie  our  identified  euro-area  shocks.  In  the  literature,  there  are  two  views  on 
shocks that have an international impact. One is to consider them as global shocks that hit 
countries roughly simultaneously. The other view is to consider them as country-specific (i.e. 
US) shocks that spread internationally. The latter clearly takes a stance on the origin of the 
shocks. Those would be recovered based on identifying restrictions on variables associated 
with the country where the shocks emerge. The former view, by contrast, does not take a 
stance on the origin of the shocks, and global shocks can be recovered as correlated national 
shocks. This is the view we adopt here. 
6.  Business cycle transmission from the euro area to the CEECs 
Let  us  now  turn  to  the  original  focus  of  our  analysis.  Table 11  shows  how  much  of  the 
variance of output and inflation growth in CEECs and EMU countries is explained by the 
                                                 
22  Recall that only stock prices of the core euro-area countries are included in our data set. 
23  The median forecast error of the common components of core euro-area countries’ stock prices increased by 
17.4% during the expansion. The forecast error only explained by the supply/demand/monetary policy shock 
changes by -1.7/5.6/12.5%. The total forecast error declined by 15.7% during the recession; a change by  
-4.3%/0.4%/-13.0% can be explained by the supply/demand/monetary policy shock. 
  15euro-area factors. On average, the common factors explain a larger part of output and inflation 
growth in EMU economies (44% and 37%) compared to the CEECs (27% and 25%). Of all 
the countries concerned, France and Germany exhibit the highest explained variance shares 
(between  63%  and  77%).  Among  the  EMU  economies,  the  euro-area  factors  are  least 
important for output growth in Greece and Portugal (14% and 16%) and for inflation growth 
in the Netherlands and in Portugal (2% and 19%).
24 Interestingly, these shares are smaller 
than  the  corresponding  shares  in  a  number  of  CEECs.  Of  the  latter,  Poland,  Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Estonia exhibit the largest variance shares explained by the euro-area 
factors in terms of output growth (between 28% and 43%) and Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania 
and  Poland  in  terms  of  changes  in  inflation (between  31%  and  42%).  Relatively  little  is 
explained by the euro-area factors of output growth variations in Latvia (6%) and of inflation 
growth variations in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (6% and 10%). The dispersion across 
EMU countries is almost twice the dispersion across the CEECs. The difference is somewhat 
lower with respect to output growth when Greece, Portugal and Ireland are excluded from the 
EMU group. 
Figure 6 presents impulse responses of output and inflation in individual countries against 
aggregate  euro-area  impulse  responses.  Again,  one  should  be  aware  of  the  fact  that,  by 
construction, impulse responses of EMU countries are more likely to coincide with aggregate 
euro-area  impulse  responses  than  impulse  responses  of  CEECs.  Confidence  bands  are 
relatively wide. It is, nevertheless, good news that impulse responses of individual countries 
do not differ significantly from aggregate euro-area impulse responses in most cases. Of the 
current  EMU  members,  Greek  output  responds  negatively  to  both  the  supply  and  the 
monetary policy shocks. Of the candidate countries, the supply shock proliferates negatively 
to output in Latvia; the response is, however, significant only in the short-run. The euro-area 
demand shock leads to a decrease or a smaller increase compared to the euro-area aggregate 
in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Poland and, on impact, Estonia. Output responses 
to the monetary policy shock are not significantly different. Responses of inflation in the 
CEECs are very similar to the euro-area responses, with the exception of Slovakia, which 
exhibits a negative reaction of inflation to the euro-area monetary policy shock, which is, 
however, barely significant. Of the EMU countries, the relatively weak inflation responses in 
Portugal to all three shocks, the Netherlands to the supply and demand shocks, Austria to the 
supply  shock  and  Luxemburg  to  the  monetary  policy  shocks  are  noticeable.  Variance 
decompositions lead to similar conclusions (Table 11).  
We now examine the standard deviations of impulse responses across countries. According to 
Figure 7, the dispersion of inflation responses across CEECs is in all cases larger than across 
EMU  members,  whereas  confidence  bands  of  the  standard  deviation  of  output  responses 
across  CEECs  overlap  with  the  corresponding  confidence  bands  across  EMU  countries. 
                                                 
24  As already mentioned above, the low value for the Netherlands seems surprising. The corresponding value for 
Dutch changes of the GDP deflator is much higher (62%).  
  16Output  responses  are  in  some  periods,  however,  more  heterogeneous  across  CEECs  than 
across EMU countries without Greece, Portugal and Ireland. These findings differ from our 
previous results where dynamic correlations and variance shares explained by the euro-area 
factors indicated more heterogeneity across EMU countries than across candidate countries.  
It is somewhat difficult to relate our results to the literature since no consensus seems to exist 
yet  on  to  what  extent  euro-area  shocks  affect  individual  CEECs.  According  to 
Korhonen (2003),  the  variance  shares  of  industrial  production  fluctuations  in  the  CEECs 
accounted for by euro-area shocks range from 11% to 34%. Boone and Maurel (1999) who 
only  consider  the  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia,  Hungary  and  Poland,  report  variance  shares 
between 55% and 80% when explained by a German shock and between 24% and 35% when 
explained by a European Union shock. The size of our variance shares lies in this large range. 
Boone and Maurel (1999) find relatively large variance shares explained by euro-area shocks 
for  Hungary,  followed  by  Slovakia,  and  rank  Poland  last.  By  contrast,  according  to 
Korhonen (2003), euro-area shocks explain most in Latvia and Slovenia, but relatively little in 
Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Poland. We can only partly support these results, 
finding that euro-area factors explain relatively much of the variance shares of business cycles 
in Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary and Estonia, but very little in Latvia.  
Darvás and Szapáry (2004) and Korhonen (2003) also compare impulse responses to euro-
area shocks of economic activity in CEECs and in the euro area. The former find responses 
that  are  larger  than  the  euro-area  average  in  Slovenia,  the  Czech  Republic,  Poland  and 
Hungary and smaller than the euro-area average responses in other CEECs. Of the CEECs, 
Korhonen (2003) finds a much larger impact of euro-area shocks on Latvia than on the euro 
area, a smaller impact on Slovakia and Lithuania and similarly large effects in the remaining 
CEECs.  The  author  also  reports  some  initial  “overshooting”  in  the  smallest  accession 
countries (Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia), where he refers to an output reaction in these 
countries larger than in the euro area, in response to a euro-area shock. We also find output 
responses of some CEECs to the monetary policy shock which are larger than the euro-area 
average output response. However, this “overshooting” is not statistically reliable. According 
to  Boone  and  Maurel (1999),  impulse  responses  of  CEECs  are  quite  homogeneous. 
Comparison  with  our  study  is  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  these  studies  do  not  report 
significance  levels.  This  may,  however,  be  important,  since  our  analysis  suggests  that 
differences between impulse responses of CEECs and the euro area are not significant in most 
cases. 
7.  Counterfactual experiment 
In this section, we investigate how output and inflation in the CEECs (and EMU member 
countries)  would  have  evolved  if  EMU  had  already  been  established  in  1993  and  if  the 
CEECs had been members. We address two hypothetical questions. The first is whether the 
  17CEECs would have gained or lost in terms of output and inflation growth variabilities in this 
counterfactual  case  compared  to  the  effective baseline  case.  The  variances  of  output  and 
inflation (as deviations from their steady states) are generally arguments in the loss function 
of a central bank. We therefore take the variabilities of output growth and changes in inflation 
as proxies for economic welfare. The second question is how an early membership would 
have influenced synchronization. We thereby acknowledge that synchronization is, like other 
OCA criteria, endogenous (e.g. Frankel and Rose (1998)), i.e. accession to EMU would lead 
to more synchronization between new and old members. 
From a theoretical perspective, the answers to the two questions are not clear. Abandoning its 
independent monetary policy and fixing the exchange rate may mean that a country looses 
important stabilization tools that can be employed to respond to asymmetric shocks. Joining a 
monetary union would, in this case, ceteris paribus raise the volatility in the economy and 
lower  synchronization  if  other  adjustment  mechanisms  like  wage  and  price  flexibility  or 
factor mobility do not fill the gap.
25 If, however, national monetary policies and exchange 
rates  were  themselves  sources  of  destabilization,  a  country  could  benefit  from  joining  a 
monetary union.
26 An accession would then, ceteris paribus, lead to a more stable economic 
environment and tighter cyclical linkages between the members of the monetary union. The 
two questions thus need to be addressed empirically.  
We carry out a counterfactual experiment. The experiment consists in restricting the paths of 
national  short-term  nominal  interest  rates,  which  we  take  as  proxies  for  monetary  policy 
instruments,  and  national  nominal  exchange  rates  to  coincide  with  the  paths  of  the 
corresponding  euro-area  aggregates.  This  is  achieved  by  collecting  the  idiosyncratic 
components of changes in output, inflation, short-term nominal interest rates and exchange 
rates specific to an individual country and by fitting a VAR model to them. This is done for 
each country. In the spirit of Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997)
27, we then add innovations 
to the residuals of the idiosyncratic components of the interest and exchange rate equations 
(which are the differences between the series and the common components multiplied by their 
standard deviations) so that the restrictions are satisfied.
28 
29 One may want to think of this 
experiment as a national central bank that intervenes whenever interest rates and exchange 
rates deviate from their aggregate euro-area counterparts in order to realign them. It should be 
                                                 
25  See Ramos and Suriñach (2004) who discuss alternative adjustment mechanisms and sketch possible benefits 
and costs of a monetary union. Von Hagen and Traistaru (2005) investigate wage flexibility in the CEECs. 
26  This  has  been  discussed  and  investigated  for  the  UK,  Canada,  Denmark  and  Sweden  in  Artis  and 
Ehrmann (2000). 
27  Their focus is on the role of systematic monetary policy in response to oil price shocks. They add innovations 
to the short-term interest rate equation in order to shut down monetary policy responses to oil price shocks. 
28  We restrict interest rates and exchange rates separately and both at the same time. To conserve space, we do 
not report the former results here and solely focus on the case where both interest and exchange rates are 
restricted. Findings based on experiments where either interest or exchange rates are restricted are available 
upon request. 
29  Since Lithuania had fixed its currency to the Dollar between 1994 and 2001, we do not use the bilateral 
exchange  rate  with  the  US  Dollar  but  with  the  Euro  for  Lithuania  and  restrict  it  to  be  constant  in  the 
counterfactual scenario.  
  18kept in mind that our model is able to account for the effects described in the preceding 
paragraph.  However,  medium-run  effects  of  accession  to  a  monetary  union,  like  those 
resulting from stronger trade and financial market linkages, cannot be captured. In addition, 
one needs to be aware that this experiment is subject to the Lucas critique. Details on the 
counterfactual  experiment  are  described  and  the  underlying  assumptions  are  discussed  in 
Appendix B.  
According to Figure 8, output is significantly higher in the mid-1990s and for a somewhat 
sustained period of time in Latvia and Poland and inflation significantly lower in Hungary 
under the counterfactual scenario compared to the baseline scenario. Let us now address the 
first  hypothetical  question  raised  at  the  beginning  of  this  section.  It  can  be  seen  from 
Table 13, that output growth variabilities are lower in the counterfactual case than in the 
baseline  case  in  Estonia,  Poland  and  Latvia.  Inflation  growth  variabilities  are  lower  for 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland and Lithuania, suggesting that these countries would benefit from 
joining EMU. The volatility of both interest rates and exchange rates declines in most cases 
(except for the Czech Republic, where interest rate volatility increases, and for Latvia, where 
exchange rate volatility rises). Differences between the counterfactual and the baseline cases 
are, however, not statistically significant.  
We also restrict the interest and exchange rate paths of individual current EMU members to 
the corresponding aggregate euro-area paths from 1993 to 1998 (and to 2000 in the case of 
Greece) to provide some comparison. We are aware that focusing on different periods does no 
provide  full  comparability  since  one  period  may  be  characterized  by  more  or  larger 
asymmetric than symmetric shocks, whereas this does not need to hold for other periods. 
Output  would  have  been  lower  in  the  Netherlands  and  Portugal  during  the  entire  period, 
whereas inflation would have been lower in Germany in the first half of the period. Output 
variability would have declined in most cases had these countries already started to form a 
monetary union in 1993, except for Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium, where 
output volatility would have risen. Austria, Finland, France, Greece and Portugal would have 
benefited from lower inflation growth variability. The impact of a monetary union on output 
and  inflation  growth  volatilities  seems  to  be  larger  for  EMU  countries  than  for  new  EU 
member states. But as was the case for the CEECs, differences between the counterfactual and 
the baseline scenarios are not significant.  
To investigate the implications of an enlargement for synchronization between CEECs and 
the euro area and within the different groups of countries, we compare dynamic correlations 
between output and inflation growth in individual countries and the corresponding euro-area 
aggregates as well as cohesion across members of each of the groups in the baseline case with 
the counterfactual cases. The estimation relies on the median estimates of the counterfactual 
series. Overall, our results confirm the endogeneity of the business cycle synchronization 
criterion,  whereas  this  evidence  is  less  clear  for  inflation  linkages.  On  average,  dynamic 
  19correlations between individual countries’ and euro-area output growth in the EMU countries 
and in the CEECs are higher in the counterfactual case than in the baseline case (Table 14). 
Of the CEECs, Hungary and Slovenia would exhibit the largest increases in the case of EMU 
enlargement. Dynamic correlations would also rise in the Czech Republic, Latvia and Poland, 
whereas  they  would  decline  or  remain  roughly  constant  in  the  other  CEECs.  Had  EMU 
already be formed in 1993, synchronization between output growth in individual countries, 
except for France, Germany and Greece, and the euro-area aggregate would have been higher 
than it actually was. Changes in inflation in EMU countries are slightly more correlated on 
average with the euro-area aggregate in the counterfactual compared to the baseline case. The 
opposite holds for the CEECs. Of the CEECs, a larger positive correlation with euro-area 
inflation growth can, however, be observed in Estonia and a smaller negative correlation in 
Slovakia. Of the EMU countries, the correlation is lower in the counterfactual case compared 
to the baseline case in France, Spain and Portugal.  
The cohesion measure was constructed for the CEECs for the period 1993 to 2003 and for the 
other groups (EMU, EMU without Greece, Ireland and Portugal, all countries) for the period 
1993  to  1998.  Figure 7  shows  the  measures  for  both  scenarios.  It  suggests  that 
synchronization is more pronounced in all groups in the counterfactual case compared to the 
baseline case.
30  
8.  Conclusion 
Overall, results are mixed. Business cycle correlations between the CEECs and the euro area 
are lower on average than between EMU countries and the euro area, but they are larger than 
in some smaller peripheral countries like Greece and Portugal. A similar picture is found for 
inflation correlations and for variance shares explained by common euro-area shocks. Based 
on all these criteria, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia seem to qualify for accession to 
EMU. Of those countries, Hungary and Estonia are particularly strongly integrated in terms of 
trade and FDI with the euro area and exhibit similary industry structures.  For the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Latvia, it may be too  early to become EMU members. Lithuania 
seems to be a special case: its output growth correlation with the euro area is very low, 
whereas  inflation  growth  correlations  and  the  variance  of  output  and  inflation  growth 
explained by euro-area factors are quite high.  
As  a  byproduct  we  identify  the  main  sources  of  economic  fluctuations  in  the  euro  area 
between 1993 and 2003. We estimate three common euro-area shocks, a supply shock, a 
demand shock and a monetary policy shock. Based on historical decompositions, we find that 
                                                 
30  In order to account for the different periods, which are considered for different groups of countries, we also 
computed cohesion measures for the CEECs for the period 1993 to 1998. Results are very similar for output 
growth  correlations.  However,  the  cohesion  of  inflation  growth  is  slightly  smaller  at  business  cycle 
frequencies in the counterfactual scenario compared to the baseline scenario. 
  20the favorable economic performance of the euro area between 1993 and 2000 can mainly be 
explained by the demand shock which stimulated output and the supply shock which held 
down  inflation.  Positive  demand  impulses  then  vanished.  Together  with  contractionary 
monetary policy shocks which triggered the sharp downturn in European stock markets, this 
seems to have caused the subsequent economic slowdown.  
It is good news that the transmission of common euro-area shocks to the CEECs does not 
seem to differ significantly from the propagation to EMU countries in most cases, basically 
with the exceptions of output responses of Latvia after the euro-area supply shock and the 
Czech  Republic,  Slovakia  and  Lithuania  to  euro-area  demand  shocks  and  the  inflation 
response of Slovakia after the monetary policy shock. Those responses are weaker than the 
corresponding euro-area responses or even negative.  
According to our counterfactual experiment, accession to EMU would basically be beneficial 
for Poland and Latvia in terms of higher output growth and lower output growth variability, 
for  Estonia  in  terms  of  lower  output  growth  variability,  for  Hungary  in  terms  of  lower 
inflation and Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania in terms of lower inflation growth 
variability. Stabilizing effects through a common monetary policy and fixed exchange rates, 
however, are not found to be significant. Business cycle linkages with the euro area can be 
expected to get closer in Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Poland, inflation 
growth linkages in Estonia. The cohesion within the group of the CEECs is expected to rise. 
No clear conclusions can be drawn on whether CEECs or EMU countries form the more 
heterogeneous group. Our various estimates point in different directions. Nevertheless, there 
seems  to  be  considerable  heterogeneity  across  CEECs  implying  that  for  some  countries, 
accession to EMU would be more costly than for others. According to our analysis and based 
on  the  measures  used  here,  Poland,  Hungary,  Slovenia  and  Estonia  are  more  suitable 
accession  candidates  than  other  countries.  The  two  latter  countries  also  signaled  their 
intention to quickly become members of EMU. 
Our analysis has a number of caveats to be kept in mind. One is the relatively short time span. 
This may imply that shocks, which were estimated here, may not be fully representative for 
the future. Another is the backward-looking nature of the analysis. This seems particularly 
relevant  for  the  CEECs  which  go  through  a  phase  of  structural  changes  and  where  the 
relationship with the euro area already differs nowadays from the relationship in the previous 
decade. Moreover and as already pointed out in the introduction, one should be aware that 
synchronization is not the only criterion that should be satisfied before a country joins a 
monetary union. Others like the integration via trade and various Maastricht criteria are not 
investigated in this paper. It finally seems appropriate to re-stress the endogeneity of OCA 
criteria. It can be expected that economies will become more synchronized mainly through 
increased trade linkages and financial integration. Those channels are, however, not captured 
  21by our model. We therefore probably have underestimated the impact of EMU enlargement 
on economic comovements. 
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This  appendix  describes  the  estimation  of  the  factor  model  and  the  identification  of  the 
structural shocks. We first estimate   by applying static principal component analysis to  .   t F t Y
  ,  (A1)  t t Y ' V ˆ F ˆ  
where   is the   matrix of eigenvectors corresponding to the largest  V ˆ r N   r eigenvalues of 
the sample correlation matrix.   is an estimate of the matrix of factor loadings  . The 
estimated vector of static factors   has a VAR(1) representation, and OLS is applied to each 
equation yielding the reduced form VAR residuals  . 
V ˆ  
t F ˆ
t u ˆ
The  -vector of orthogonalized residuals is estimated as   q
  ,  (A2)   t t u ˆ P' M v ˆ
2 / 1    
where   is a   matrix with the largest  q eigenvalues of   on the main diagonal 
and zeros elsewhere and  .   is the corresponding 
M q q  ) u ˆ cov( t
q t I ) v ˆ cov(   P q r   matrix of eigenvectors. 
The vector of orthogonalized residuals   is linearly related to the vector of structural shocks 
 through the   orthonormal rotation matrix R :  
t v ˆ
t w q q 
  t t v ˆ R' w ˆ   ,  (A3)  
with   and  . The  q t I ) w ˆ cov(   q I R R'   1   q  vector of impulse response functions of variable i 
to the shocks    ' w ... w1 qt t  at horizon   is given by
31   h
  ,  (A4)  R)' PM A '   (
1/2 h
i ih    
where   is the ith row of  .   has to be chosen such that the identifying restrictions 
specified in the main text are satisfied. Any rotation matrix R  can be parametrized as follows  
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To systematically explore the factor space, the rotation angles  1   ,  2    and  3    are varied on a 
grid from 0 to  2 /   . Further rotations would only result in repetitions, possibly with a flipped 
                                                 
31  Impulse responses are also multiplied with the variables’ standard deviations. 
  23sign. The number of grids are chosen to be 12 for computational reasons
32, and  1   ,  2    and  3    
are fixed, so that the imposed restrictions are satisfied. 31 rotations satisfy our restrictions. 
Canova and de Nicólo (2003) who apply a similar identification scheme suggest, in this case, 
imposing more restrictions which allow to fix only one rotation. We decide not to do so but 
give equal probability to all of them. A reason is that we will not focus on the point estimates 
but on the median impulse responses and the confidence bands below. As we will explain 
below, those are obtained with bootstrap techniques, and for each draw, a different number of 
rotations satisfying the restrictions may arise. Imposing more restrictions in order to get one 
single point estimate therefore would not help much. A possibility to cope with this issue is to 
apply Uhlig’s (2004) Bayesian based method. This is, however, left for future work. 
Since  , the uncertainty involved with the factor estimation can be neglected (see, e.g. 
Bernanke  and  Boivin (2003)).  In  order  to  account  for  the  uncertainty  involved  with  the 
estimation of the VAR model on the factors, we construct confidence bands by means of the 
bootstrap-after-bootstrap  techniques based  on  Kilian (1998).  These  techniques  allow  us  to 
remove a possible bias in the VAR coefficients which can arise due to the small sample size 
of the VAR model (for details on the bootstrap see Kilian (1998)). Most draws deliver not just 
one, but a set of shocks which all satisfy the restrictions. In this case, we follow Peersman 
(2005) and draw and save one of them. Some draws, however, do not deliver any shocks 
satisfying the restrictions. We draw until we have saved 500 shocks (614 draws were needed). 
For more details on the identification, the reader is referred to Peersman (2005).  
T N   
                                                 
32  In the case of a  3 3  rotation, there are  2 / ) 1 3 ( 3      bivariate rotations of different elements of the VAR model 
for a fixed angle. If we choose the number of grids to equal 12, this amounts to   rotations.  1728 12
1)/2 - 3(3  
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In this appendix, the counterfactual experiment is described in more detail. We proceed in 
four steps. 
Step 1. The estimated idiosyncratic components of changes in output, inflation, interest rates 
and exchange rates of each country   (which are the differences between the series and the 
common components multiplied by their standard deviations) are collected in the   vector 
.   denotes the estimate of the idiosyncratic component of 
variable   of country   in period t,   refers to output growth,   to changes 
in inflation,   to changes in interest rates and   to exchange rate changes.  
j
1 4 
)' ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ
4 3 2 1 jt i jt i jt i jt i jt             kjt   ˆ
} 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 { i i i i k   j 1 i 2 i
3 i 4 i
Step 2. A VAR( ) model is fitted to  :   j p jt   ˆ





u ˆ A c ˆ
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This  yields  the  estimates  )' ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( c ˆ 4 3 2 1 j i j i j i j i j c c c c   ,    and 
. The Schwarz information criterion suggests   for each 
. This and the following steps are done for all  . 
j jl p l ,..., 1 , A ˆ  
)' ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( u ˆ 4 3 2 1 jt i jt i jt i jt i jt u u u u   1   j p
j j
Step 3. Three counterfactual scenarios are considered. Under the first scenario, the paths of 
both  national  interest  and  exchange  rates  are  restricted  to  coincide  with  the  paths  of  the 
corresponding euro-area aggregates. I.e.   is restricted to equal   for each   and  t, 
where EA refers to the euro-area aggregate. In addition,   is restricted to equal  . 
Under the second and the third scenarios, either the path of   or the path of   is 
restricted. In this appendix we only describe and in the main text we only refer to the first 
scenario. It is straightforward to carry out the other two experiments.  
jt i y 3 EAt i y 3 j
jt i y 4 EAt i y 4
jt i y 3 jt i y 4
Following Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997), we add some innovations  jt i3    and  jt i4    to 
the residuals of the idiosyncratic components of the interest and exchange rate equations,  
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where  CF  refers  to  the  counterfactual  scenario  and 
 to the new counterfactual shocks. Technically, 
those are generated by selecting 
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where   and   are the third and the fourth rows of  . This is done recursively:  jl i3 A ˆ
jl i4 A ˆ
jl A ˆ
j jp i3    
and 
j jp i4    are computed according to (B3) and are then fed into (B2), yielding  .   and 





1 3   j jp i    and  1 4   j jp i   , which are, again, fed into (B2), yielding   
etc. We take   as starting values for  .  
CF
jp j 1    
1 0 ˆ ,..., ˆ
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Step 4. The counterfactual series are finally constructed as follows 




jt         F ˆ ' ˆ Y
Confidence bands were bootstrapped as described in Section 4 of the main text. Analogously, 
the uncertainty involved with the estimation of the idiosyncratic components is not taken into 
account,  but  the  uncertainty  involved  with  the  estimation  of  the  VAR  model  on  the 
idiosyncratic components.  
Some remarks and words of caution are in order. In this experiment, counterfactual changes in 
one country can affect output, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates of the same country. 
But variables of other countries and the common factors remain unaltered. Given that the 
CEECs are too small to have an impact on the euro area which is the most important trading 
partner of the CEECs, this is not an implausible assumption. The restriction is, however, more 
severe restriction for the EMU members. It should further be kept in mind that we ignore the 
contemporaneous covariances between the residuals of the VAR model on the idiosyncratic 
components.  Alternatively,  we  could  have  estimated  structural  orthogonal  idiosyncratic 
exchange  and  interest  rate  shocks.  This  would,  however,  have  involved  relying  on 
questionable identifying restrictions, and we decided not to do so. Moreover and as already 
stressed in the main text, we are aware that this experiment is subject to the Lucas critique: 
changes  of  private  sector  expectations  of  the  policy  process  that  may  result  from  policy 
changes and alter the parameters of the model are not accounted for. Also, possible beneficial 
consequences of an accession to EMU in terms of a more stable environment resulting, for 
example, from a reduction in transactions costs, from less uncertainty and from increased risk 
sharing
33 as a consequence of fiscal transfers and more integrated capital markets are also 
neglected.  In  addition,  the  main  channels  through  which  accession  to  a  monetary  union 
strengthens  cyclical  comovements  are  trade  and  financial  integration.  Trade  linkages  and 
linkages between financial markets will tighten gradually and it will take some time before 
they affect economic comovements. This effect cannot be captured by our model.  
                                                 
33  This has been investigated by Demyanyk and Volosovych (2005) who estimate potential welfare gains from 
risk sharing implied by the transition to a monetary union for the CEECs in a counterfactual experiment. The 
authors  find  that  those  gains  would  be  relatively  large  for  the  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia  and  the  Baltic 
countries. 
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  29Table 1: Data 
Country/region Variable
Euro area (aggregate variables) Current account balance
Effective exchange rate nominal













Imports of goods and services deflator 
Imports of goods and services real
Net foreign assets
Net factor income from abroad
Net factor income from abroad/GDP
Consumption deflator
Consumption real
Household's disposable income nominal
Household's disposable income real
Variation of stocks deflator
Variation of stocks real
Short-term interest rate nominal










Exports of goods and services deflator
Exports of goods and services real
GDP deflator
GDP real  
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Core EMU member countries GDP, volume, market prices 
(AUT, BEL, FRA, GER, ITA, NLD, ESP)  Private final consumption expenditure
Private total fixed capital formation, volume
1) 
Industrial production
Capacity utilization rate manufacturing
Total employment






GDP deflator, market prices 
Short-term interest rate nominal
Long-term interest rate (gvt. bonds) nominal
M1
M3
Main stock price index
Imports (goods and services), volume
Exports (goods and services), volume 
Bilateral exchange rate with US Dollar nominal
Current account balance
Remaining EMU countries (FIN, GRC,  GDP, volume, market prices 
IRE, LUX, PRT) and CEECs (CZ, ES,  CPI, harmonized 
HUN, LT, LV, PL, SI, SK) Short-term interest rate nominal







1) Total fixed investment for Spain.
2) Not included for Belgium, Italy and Spain.
3) WPI for Austria.
4) Bilateral exchange rate with the Euro for Lithuania.
















AUT 17.0 1.42 0.65 0.43 0.19 0.52 0.24 0.27 0.12
BEL 9.4 3.70 1.43 1.06 0.40 - - 1.50 0.58
FIN 18.4 0.41 0.29 0.21 0.14 0.36 0.26 0.31 0.22
FRA 14.4 5.28 0.43 1.71 0.11 5.97 0.50 3.04 0.21
GER 16.0 7.30 0.48 2.93 0.15 7.90 0.53 3.60 0.18
GRC 43.7 0.33 0.22 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.05
IRE
4) 41.7 0.62 0.47 0.32 0.24 1.38 1.09 0.73 0.56
ITA 6.6 3.51 0.33 1.29 0.10 2.41 0.23 1.00 0.08
LUX 52.6 0.26 1.10 0.06 0.27 4.82 21.57 3.18 14.19
NLD 9.6 3.65 0.86 1.21 0.27 4.22 1.01 2.34 0.53
PRT 22.9 0.67 0.52 0.17 0.13 0.62 0.49 0.23 0.18
ESP 26.8 2.63 0.39 0.79 0.11 - - 1.44 0.21
CZ 41.5 0.71 0.89 0.22 0.27 0.42 0.55 0.13 0.16
ES 24.8 0.06 0.71 0.02 0.30 0.02 0.30 0.02 0.22
HU 19.7 0.63 0.87 0.20 0.27 - - 0.12 0.17
LT 48.2 0.06 0.39 0.04 0.22 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09
LV 37.8 0.04 0.36 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.10
PL 28.0 0.80 0.44 0.29 0.16 0.47 0.24 0.15 0.08
SI 27.9 0.19 0.78 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.20 0.02 0.08
SK 28.8 0.28 0.98 0.10 0.33 0.09 0.33 0.03 0.11
Mean
1) all countries 26.8 1.63 0.63 0.56 0.21 1.73 1.64 0.91 0.91
Mean
1) EMU 23.3 2.48 0.60 0.86 0.18 2.84 2.61 1.48 1.43
Mean
1) EMU \ GRC, PRT, IRE 19.0 3.13 0.66 1.08 0.19 3.74 3.48 1.85 1.82
Mean
1) CEECs 32.1 0.35 0.68 0.12 0.25 0.15 0.26 0.06 0.13
Std. all countries 13.5 2.04 0.32 0.75 0.09 2.46 5.14 1.20 3.13
Std. EMU  15.0 2.27 0.36 0.85 0.09 2.73 6.67 1.27 4.02
Std. EMU \ GRC, PRT, IRE 14.0 2.28 0.39 0.88 0.10 2.81 7.98 1.24 4.65
Std. CEECs 9.5 0.32 0.25 0.10 0.06 0.20 0.16 0.06 0.05
1) Unweigted average.
2) Refers to stocks of FDI at the end of 2002. The FDI
1 measures are multiplied by 100, the FDI
2 measures by 1013. Sources: Eurostat and ECB for Belgium. 
   World GDP is taken from the IMF.
3) Refers to trade flows in 2003. The TR
1 measures are multiplied by 100, the TR
2 measures by 10
13. Source: ECB. World GDP is taken from the IMF.
4) Irish FDI to the rest of the euro area refers to 2001.
5) See Clark and Wincoop (2001) for more details on the measures.
6) Structural similarities of industry specialization. Refers to 2003.   
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AUT 0.58 0.77 0.53 0.57
BEL 0.61 0.78 0.59 0.49
FIN 0.28 0.59 0.47 0.43
FRA 0.59 0.90 0.86 0.83
GER 0.77 0.86 0.82 0.73
GRC -0.11 -0.13 0.54 0.47
IRE 0.53 0.61 0.48 0.37
ITA 0.47 0.74 0.54 0.43
LUX 0.33 0.59 0.58 0.52
NLD 0.64 0.82 0.13 0.16
PRT 0.15 0.35 0.00 0.10
ESP 0.39 0.64 0.61 0.53
CZ -0.04 -0.09 0.25 0.19
ES 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.12
HU 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.26
LT 0.08 -0.04 0.35 0.33
LV -0.06 0.12 0.21 0.18
PL 0.19 0.27 0.34 0.31
SI 0.21 0.54 0.27 0.26
SK 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05
Mean
4) all countries 0.30 0.44 0.40 0.36
Mean
4) EMU 0.44 0.63 0.51 0.47
Mean
4) EMU \ GRC, PRT, IRE 0.52 0.74 0.57 0.52
Mean
4) CEECs 0.10 0.17 0.22 0.20
Std. all countries 0.26 0.34 0.24 0.22
Std. EMU  0.24 0.28 0.24 0.20
Std. EMU \ GRC, PRT, IRE 0.16 0.11 0.21 0.19
Std. CEECs 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.12
1) On average over all/business cycle frequencies. The latter correspond to 6 to 32 quarters.
2) Real GDP growth.
3) CPI inflation growth.
4) Unweighted.  





Lead/lag Max. correl. Contemp. correl. Lead/lag Max. correl. Contemp. correl.
AUT 0 0.61 0.61 0 0.52 0.52
BEL 0 0.67 0.67 0 0.63 0.63
FIN -1 0.31 0.29 0 0.51 0.51
FRA 0 0.72 0.72 0 0.88 0.88
GER 0 0.76 0.76 0 0.88 0.88
GRC -4 0.19 -0.09 0 0.61 0.61
IRE 0 0.51 0.51 0 0.50 0.50
ITA 0 0.53 0.53 0 0.60 0.60
LUX 1 0.66 0.55 0 0.58 0.58
NLD 0 0.71 0.71 4 0.26 0.10
PRT -3 0.36 0.23 1 0.33 -0.07
ESP 0 0.45 0.45 0 0.63 0.63
CZ -2 0.09 -0.04 0 0.28 0.28
ES 0 0.12 0.12 -3 0.19 0.16
HU 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.24 0.24
LT 0 0.04 0.04 0 0.35 0.35
LV -1 0.09 -0.04 -3 0.30 0.22
PL 1 0.32 0.19 0 0.40 0.40
SI -1 0.35 0.24 0 0.26 0.26
SK 0 0.06 0.06 2 0.18 0.02
Mean
4) all countries -0.4 0.41 0.36 0.1 0.47 0.42
Mean
4) EMU -0.6 0.54 0.49 0.4 0.58 0.53
Mean
4) EMU \ GRC, PRT, IRE 0.0 0.60 0.59 0.4 0.61 0.59
Mean
4) CEECs -0.1 0.18 0.12 -0.6 0.28 0.24
Std. all countries 1.2 0.24 0.27 1.5 0.21 0.27
Std. EMU  1.4 0.18 0.25 1.2 0.18 0.27
Std. EMU \ GRC, PRT, IRE 0.5 0.15 0.15 1.3 0.19 0.23
Std. CEECs 0.7 0.13 0.11 1.8 0.08 0.13
1) Positive values indicate by how many quarters the euro-area aggregate leads.
2) Real GDP growth.
3) CPI inflation growth.
4) Unweighted.  
 
Table 5: Bai and Ng (2002) criteria to select r
1) 
ICp1 ICp2 ICp3
1 -0.102 -0.098 -0.113
2 -0.128 * -0.118 * -0.150
3 -0.120 -0.106 -0.154
4 -0.111 -0.093 -0.156
5 -0.101 -0.078 -0.157 *
6 -0.074 -0.046 -0.141
7 -0.049 -0.016 -0.127
8 -0.023 0.014 -0.112
9 0.004 0.046 -0.096
10 0.033 0.079 -0.080
1) Based on r max=10. Asterisks 
   indicate the minima.  
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components (PCs) 


















2 0.597 * 0.974
3 0.674 0.842 *
4 1.633 1.675
5 3.148 3.148
1) Based on canonical correlation 
   analysis. Conditional on r=5. 
   Asterisks indicate the minima.  
 
 









Short-term interest rate 0.72
Long-term interest rate 0.67
Effect. exchange rate real 0.85
Current account 0.53
1) First difference of these variables.  
  35Table 9: Variance decompositions of selected aggregate euro-area variables
1) 
Supply shock Demand shock Monetary pol. shock
GDP 0.19 ( 0.11 0.24 ) 0.40 ( 0.35 0.42 ) 0.39 ( 0.36 0.54 )
Investment 0.26 ( 0.19 0.27 ) 0.55 ( 0.42 0.71 ) 0.19 ( 0.03 0.32 )
Consumption 0.10 ( 0.01 0.25 ) 0.70 ( 0.49 0.91 ) 0.20 ( 0.07 0.31 )
Employment 0.64 ( 0.20 0.89 ) 0.25 ( 0.05 0.29 ) 0.13 ( 0.01 0.45 )
Productivity 0.45 ( 0.05 0.55 ) 0.17 ( 0.07 0.87 ) 0.39 ( 0.07 0.40 )
CPI inflation 0.76 ( 0.05 0.99 ) 0.16 ( 0.00 0.53 ) 0.07 ( 0.00 0.42 )
Short-term interest rate 0.04 ( 0.00 0.57 ) 0.76 ( 0.39 0.85 ) 0.18 ( 0.02 0.29 )
Long-term interest rate 0.13 ( 0.01 0.71 ) 0.61 ( 0.06 0.83 ) 0.22 ( 0.02 0.37 )
Effect. exchange rate real 0.09 ( 0.00 0.57 ) 0.26 ( 0.03 0.39 ) 0.64 ( 0.18 0.91 )
Current account 0.25 ( 0.02 0.26 ) 0.63 ( 0.06 0.82 ) 0.14 ( 0.01 0.86 )
1) Median and 90% confidence bands. Horizons 0 to 5 years. Separate variance decompositions 
   for the short run (0 to 1 year) and the medium run (3 to 5 years) are not reported here, but 





Table 10: Historical decomposition of selected aggregate euro-area variables
1) 
Total forecast error Forecast error explained by the
supply shock demand shock monetary policy shock
Phase of expansion (1994Q4-2000Q4)
GDP
2) 3.10 ( 1.25 5.24 ) -0.01 ( -0.14 0.13 ) 2.29 ( 0.52 4.35 ) 0.79 ( 0.20 1.61 )
Investment
2) 7.55 ( 3.15 12.63 ) -0.06 ( -0.40 0.27 ) 6.37 ( 1.87 10.98 ) 1.22 ( -0.08 3.17 )
Consumption
2) 1.79 ( 0.75 2.84 ) 0.04 ( -0.05 0.14 ) 1.40 ( 0.39 2.44 ) 0.30 ( -0.04 0.78 )
Employment
2) 0.27 ( -0.02 0.52 ) -0.01 ( -0.04 0.01 ) 0.24 ( -0.08 0.47 ) 0.04 ( -0.04 0.16 )
Productivity
2) 1.26 ( -0.33 2.80 ) -0.03 ( -0.17 0.06 ) 0.82 ( -0.79 2.34 ) 0.46 ( -0.08 1.15 )
CPI inflation
2) 0.71 ( 0.11 1.44 ) 0.03 ( -0.04 0.09 ) 0.55 ( 0.05 1.32 ) 0.08 ( -0.06 0.33 )
Short-term interest rate
3) 3.24 ( 1.80 4.93 ) 0.11 ( -0.03 0.25 ) 2.68 ( 1.24 4.20 ) 0.47 ( -0.06 1.13 )
Long-term interest rate
3) 2.05 ( 0.46 3.68 ) 0.07 ( -0.12 0.20 ) 1.80 ( 0.05 3.18 ) 0.23 ( -0.40 0.99 )
Effect. exchange rate real
2) -30.89 ( -50.97 -3.29 ) 0.72 ( -0.76 2.32 ) -21.26 ( -44.06 11.41 ) -12.87 ( -21.37 -2.45 )
Current account balance
4) -2.98 ( -5.10 -0.79 ) 0.05 ( -0.10 0.19 ) -2.82 ( -4.82 -0.34 ) -0.25 ( -1.12 0.50 )
Phase of slowdown/stabilization (2001Q1-2003Q4)
GDP
2) -2.82 ( -4.35 -1.56 ) -0.36 ( -0.77 -0.13 ) -1.10 ( -2.42 -0.14 ) -1.25 ( -2.44 -0.36 )
Investment
2) -5.49 ( -8.85 -2.78 ) -1.06 ( -2.08 -0.25 ) -2.30 ( -4.92 -0.39 ) -1.94 ( -4.73 -0.14 )
Consumption
2) -1.70 ( -2.64 -0.82 ) -0.17 ( -0.35 0.01 ) -0.93 ( -1.68 -0.30 ) -0.54 ( -1.26 0.01 )
Employment
2) -0.24 ( -0.46 -0.05 ) -0.10 ( -0.15 -0.04 ) -0.06 ( -0.20 0.07 ) -0.07 ( -0.25 0.04 )
Productivity
2) -1.39 ( -2.56 -0.20 ) -0.32 ( -0.72 -0.02 ) -0.28 ( -1.19 0.58 ) -0.73 ( -1.81 0.09 )
CPI inflation
2) 0.22 ( -0.29 0.74 ) 0.36 ( 0.11 0.52 ) -0.04 ( -0.40 0.22 ) -0.03 ( -0.36 0.20 )
Short-term interest rate
3) -2.33 ( -3.88 -1.15 ) 0.07 ( -0.27 0.32 ) -1.47 ( -2.68 -0.62 ) -0.84 ( -1.94 -0.02 )
Long-term interest rate
3) -0.91 ( -2.37 0.49 ) 0.17 ( -0.26 0.53 ) -0.57 ( -1.54 0.45 ) -0.43 ( -1.63 0.53 )
Effect. exchange rate real
2) 32.90 ( 6.18 68.17 ) 1.86 ( -4.61 9.22 ) 9.83 ( -6.89 33.83 ) 19.68 ( 1.17 38.22 )
Current account balance
4)
1.86 ( 0.35 3.60 ) 0.48 ( -0.04 1.10 ) 0.95 ( -0.01 2.03 ) 0.38 ( -0.61 1.54 )
1) Median and 90% confidence intervals. Refers to the change of the 8-quarters ahead forecast error of the common component between 
   the last and the first quarter of the considered period. It is referred to the 8-quarters ahead forecast error, since the path of the forecast 
   error of the common component of euro-area GDP is consistent with the CEPR dating of the euro-area slowdown in 2001Q1.
2) Percent.
3) Percentage points.
4) Levels, divided by 1000.  
  36Table 11: Variance shares of output and inflation growth in individual countries 

























3) all countries 0.37 0.32
Mean
3) EMU 0.44 0.37
Mean
3) EMU \ GRC, PRT, IRE 0.52 0.39
Mean
3) CEECs 0.27 0.25
Std. all countries 0.18 0.20
Std. EMU  0.19 0.23
Std. EMU \ GRC, PRT, IRE 0.14 0.24
Std. CEECs 0.11 0.13
1) Real GDP growth.
2) CPI inflation growth.
3) Unweighted.  
  37Table 12: Variance decompositions of output and inflation of individual countries
1) 
Supply shock Demand shock Monetary pol. shock
Y
2)
AUT 0.36 ( 0.27 0.44 ) 0.20 ( 0.01 0.36 ) 0.44 ( 0.36 0.55 )
BEL 0.19 ( 0.05 0.23 ) 0.38 ( 0.27 0.39 ) 0.43 ( 0.38 0.67 )
FIN 0.23 ( 0.02 0.30 ) 0.16 ( 0.04 0.78 ) 0.60 ( 0.12 0.84 )
FRA 0.11 ( 0.00 0.19 ) 0.37 ( 0.06 0.41 ) 0.53 ( 0.40 0.85 )
GER 0.45 ( 0.32 0.74 ) 0.39 ( 0.10 0.41 ) 0.16 ( 0.03 0.33 )
GRC 0.55 ( 0.02 0.61 ) 0.14 ( 0.00 0.95 ) 0.30 ( 0.01 0.41 )
IRE 0.20 ( 0.15 0.23 ) 0.40 ( 0.18 0.42 ) 0.39 ( 0.36 0.63 )
ITA 0.15 ( 0.01 0.23 ) 0.21 ( 0.02 0.48 ) 0.64 ( 0.31 0.97 )
LUX 0.11 ( 0.00 0.22 ) 0.37 ( 0.05 0.41 ) 0.51 ( 0.38 0.88 )
NLD 0.24 ( 0.23 0.27 ) 0.39 ( 0.28 0.41 ) 0.37 ( 0.35 0.46 )
PRT 0.08 ( 0.00 0.78 ) 0.48 ( 0.05 0.50 ) 0.45 ( 0.17 0.50 )
ESP 0.10 ( 0.01 0.65 ) 0.52 ( 0.13 0.62 ) 0.38 ( 0.21 0.40 )
CZ 0.10 ( 0.00 0.81 ) 0.71 ( 0.02 0.79 ) 0.16 ( 0.02 0.31 )
ES 0.33 ( 0.01 0.36 ) 0.13 ( 0.03 0.89 ) 0.53 ( 0.08 0.65 )
HU 0.19 ( 0.01 0.28 ) 0.11 ( 0.01 0.74 ) 0.69 ( 0.16 0.89 )
LT 0.23 ( 0.00 0.62 ) 0.71 ( 0.01 0.97 ) 0.12 ( 0.01 0.36 )
LV 0.26 ( 0.01 0.95 ) 0.48 ( 0.03 0.63 ) 0.25 ( 0.01 0.38 )
PL 0.52 ( 0.01 0.68 ) 0.35 ( 0.01 0.92 ) 0.15 ( 0.02 0.36 )
SI 0.19 ( 0.01 0.26 ) 0.10 ( 0.00 0.62 ) 0.70 ( 0.29 0.90 )
SK 0.41 ( 0.01 0.68 ) 0.53 ( 0.01 0.94 ) 0.07 ( 0.01 0.31 )
 
3)
AUT 0.34 ( 0.01 0.93 ) 0.16 ( 0.00 0.44 ) 0.50 ( 0.04 0.59 )
BEL 0.38 ( 0.00 0.97 ) 0.39 ( 0.01 0.59 ) 0.24 ( 0.00 0.42 )
FIN 0.67 ( 0.03 0.92 ) 0.07 ( 0.01 0.37 ) 0.31 ( 0.01 0.61 )
FRA 0.75 ( 0.04 0.99 ) 0.17 ( 0.00 0.53 ) 0.08 ( 0.00 0.42 )
GER 0.69 ( 0.02 0.97 ) 0.08 ( 0.01 0.46 ) 0.23 ( 0.00 0.52 )
GRC 0.67 ( 0.03 0.95 ) 0.06 ( 0.00 0.42 ) 0.28 ( 0.01 0.56 )
IRE 0.52 ( 0.01 0.99 ) 0.28 ( 0.01 0.55 ) 0.20 ( 0.00 0.42 )
ITA 0.51 ( 0.01 0.77 ) 0.47 ( 0.01 0.87 ) 0.07 ( 0.00 0.23 )
LUX 0.21 ( 0.00 0.92 ) 0.35 ( 0.01 0.52 ) 0.44 ( 0.07 0.52 )
NLD 0.29 ( 0.01 0.87 ) 0.16 ( 0.03 0.46 ) 0.53 ( 0.03 0.67 )
PRT 0.07 ( 0.00 0.77 ) 0.70 ( 0.04 0.80 ) 0.18 ( 0.05 0.30 )
ESP 0.62 ( 0.02 0.98 ) 0.29 ( 0.01 0.60 ) 0.09 ( 0.00 0.38 )
CZ 0.62 ( 0.05 0.80 ) 0.19 ( 0.10 0.57 ) 0.19 ( 0.08 0.37 )
ES 0.20 ( 0.01 0.29 ) 0.13 ( 0.01 0.85 ) 0.64 ( 0.03 0.79 )
HU 0.43 ( 0.01 0.68 ) 0.50 ( 0.01 0.94 ) 0.09 ( 0.00 0.32 )
LT 0.76 ( 0.03 0.91 ) 0.24 ( 0.00 0.72 ) 0.06 ( 0.00 0.24 )
LV 0.74 ( 0.02 0.91 ) 0.21 ( 0.02 0.71 ) 0.09 ( 0.01 0.26 )
PL 0.42 ( 0.00 0.68 ) 0.49 ( 0.01 0.94 ) 0.12 ( 0.01 0.32 )
SI 0.21 ( 0.00 0.91 ) 0.53 ( 0.03 0.63 ) 0.27 ( 0.02 0.40 )
SK 0.16 ( 0.01 0.26 ) 0.17 ( 0.06 0.71 ) 0.67 ( 0.05 0.85 )
1) Variance shares explained by the shocks of the common components at
   horizons 0 to 5 years. Median and 90% confidence bands. 
2) Real GDP.
3) CPI inflation.  





AUT 0.80 ( 0.50 1.31 ) 0.94 ( 0.47 2.11 )
BEL 1.06 ( 0.62 1.65 ) 1.82 ( 0.70 13.10 )
FIN 0.81 ( 0.48 1.46 ) 0.65 ( 0.35 1.08 )
FRA 0.87 ( 0.51 1.30 ) 1.05 ( 0.63 1.54 )
GER 0.89 ( 0.59 1.26 ) 1.12 ( 0.67 1.88 )
GRC 0.89 ( 0.49 1.52 ) 0.87 ( 0.48 1.58 )
IRE 1.17 ( 0.58 2.16 ) 1.77 ( 0.91 3.59 )
ITA 0.65 ( 0.36 1.09 ) 1.46 ( 0.71 3.00 )
LUX 0.90 ( 0.44 1.48 ) 1.79 ( 0.88 3.42 )
NLD 1.50 ( 0.92 2.20 ) 0.96 ( 0.47 2.02 )
PRT 1.52 ( 0.73 2.60 ) 0.81 ( 0.47 1.32 )
ESP 0.68 ( 0.36 1.16 ) 1.82 ( 0.86 3.65 )
CZ 1.05 ( 0.68 1.64 ) 1.02 ( 0.55 1.62 )
ES 0.96 ( 0.57 1.45 ) 1.02 ( 0.70 1.49 )
HU 1.10 ( 0.69 1.68 ) 1.02 ( 0.67 1.57 )
LT 1.05 ( 0.66 1.49 ) 0.98 ( 0.67 1.53 )
LV 0.98 ( 0.62 1.66 ) 1.21 ( 0.82 1.83 )
PL 0.98 ( 0.69 1.39 ) 0.95 ( 0.64 1.37 )
SI 1.02 ( 0.61 1.70 ) 0.92 ( 0.57 1.52 )
SK 1.02 ( 0.64 1.63 ) 0.82 ( 0.46 1.60 )
1) Variance of the series in the counterfactual case divided 
    by the variance of the series under the baseline scenario. 
   Median and 90% confidence bands.





Table 14: Dynamic correlations with the euro-area aggregates in the counterfactual case 
compared to the baseline case
4) 












1) all frequ. bc frequ.
1)
AUT 0.57 0.77 0.53 0.57 0.83 0.89 0.69 0.67
BEL 0.65 0.77 0.60 0.52 0.86 0.93 0.54 0.51
FIN 0.30 0.60 0.48 0.43 0.52 0.77 0.74 0.61
FRA 0.59 0.90 0.86 0.82 0.65 0.88 0.79 0.68
GER 0.78 0.87 0.82 0.71 0.76 0.86 0.72 0.62
GRC -0.12 -0.17 0.60 0.52 -0.38 -0.40 0.71 0.59
IRE 0.53 0.59 0.49 0.39 0.85 0.89 0.68 0.57
ITA 0.50 0.74 0.53 0.41 0.51 0.84 0.71 0.61
LUX 0.05 0.17 0.40 0.33 0.52 0.58 0.52 0.43
NLD 0.49 0.68 0.06 0.09 0.70 0.80 0.33 0.31
PRT 0.05 0.02 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.36 -0.02 -0.05
ESP 0.25 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.27
CZ -0.01 -0.23 0.26 0.32 0.27 0.09 0.46 0.27
ES 0.17 0.14 -0.15 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.12
HU 0.35 0.28 0.02 0.07 0.34 0.68 -0.02 -0.05
LT 0.34 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.16 0.26 0.46 0.30
LV 0.00 0.24 0.19 0.10 -0.08 0.34 0.17 0.06
PL 0.33 0.34 0.14 0.09 0.39 0.29 -0.14 -0.16
SI 0.30 0.31 0.00 0.09 0.28 0.65 0.10 0.05
SK 0.22 0.22 -0.19 -0.26 0.24 0.06 -0.24 -0.16
1) On average over all/business cycle frequencies. The latter correspond to 6 to 32 quarters.
2) Real GDP growth.
3) CPI inflation growth.
4) 1993-1998 for EMU countries except for GRC, 1993-2000 for GRC, 1993-2003 for CEECs. Estimation is based on the median estimate of 
  the counterfactual time series.  
 
  39Figure 1: Economic comovements in the euro area and CEECs 
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  40Figure 2: Cohesion
1) 



















All countries (solid), EMU (dashed), EMU \ GRC,IRE,PRT (solid circle), CEECs (dotted) 
 
   
 
1)  Y refers to real GDP growth and   to CPI inflation growth. 
 
  41Figure 3: Euro-area shock series
1) 





















1)  The size of the shocks is one standard deviation. Median point estimates. 
 
 



















































































































































policy   
shock    
1)  To shocks of size one standard deviation. Median: solid, 90% confidence bands: dotted. Abbreviations are Y:  
    real GDP, I: real investment, C: real consumption, N: employment, Y/N: labor productivity,  : CPI inflation,  
    ST i: short-term nominal interest rate, LT i: long-term nominal interest rate, EER real: real effective exchange  
    rate, CA bal: current account balance. 
  42Figure 5: Historical decomposition of selected aggregate euro-area variables
1) 
















Total forecast error (solid), Forecast error expl. by the supply shock (dotted), the demand shock (solid circle), the monetary policy shock (dashed) 
 
1)  Median estimates. It is referred to the 8-quarters-ahead forecast error of the common component.  
  43Figure 6: Impulse responses of output and inflation of individual countries (black) and 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1)  To shocks of size one standard deviation. Median: solid, 90% confidence bands: dotted. Y refers to real GDP 
and   to CPI inflation. 
  46Figure 7: Average standard deviations of impulse responses to euro-area shocks
1) 



























CEECs (black), EMU (gray)
































CEECs (black), EMU without GRC,PRT,IRE (gray)






1)  To shocks of size one standard deviation. Median: solid, 90% confidence bands: dotted. Y refers to real GDP 
and   to CPI inflation. 
 
 




















































































































































































































Baseline scenario (gray), counterfactual scenario (black - median (solid), 90% confidence interval (dotted)) 
  
 
1)  Y refers to real GDP and   to CPI inflation. The graphs for the CEECs refer to 1993 to 2003, those for the 
EMU countries to 1993 to 1998 and those for Greece to 1993 to 2000. 
 
  48Figure 9: Cohesion in the counterfactual case (black) and the baseline case (gray)
1) 


















All countries (solid), EMU (dashed), EMU \ GRC,IRE,PRT (solid circle), CEECs (dotted)
  
 
1)  It is referred to the case where both interest and exchange rates are restricted. Measures for the CEECs based 
on the period 1993 to 2003, all other measures are based on the period 1993 to 1998. Y refers to real GDP and 
  to CPI inflation growth. Estimation is based on the median estimates of the counterfactual times series. 
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